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Abstract
Purpose - Key account management is a supplier company initiated relational approach that has received great attention 
from both academics and practitioners manifested in the business-to-business relationship literatures. However, there is 
widespread debate and contention on what should be the underlying theoretical base for defining this vital part of 
relationship marketing. With the insights from the social exchange theory, present paper explores how social exchange 
affects the dynamic nature of key account management relationship at the organizational level. 
Research design, data, and methodology - The paper follows a comprehensive review approach to examine the relationship 
between social exchange theory and key account management approach. Conceptual arguments and findings are assessed 
across studies with the main objective of showing how social exchange theory develops the governance mechanism in 
maintaining the key account relationship. 
Results - Since relational norm is considered as a glue for the maintenance of buyer-seller relationship in social exchange 
theory, factors develop the non-contractual governance mechanism ‘relationship’ in business-to-business relationship and this 
norm replaces or supplements more formal governance mechanisms such as contracts are explored.
Conclusions - This paper advances central relational norm to manage the company’s most important key customers and 
demonstrates how this norm can be developed in buyer-seller key account relationship. Implications from this new 
perspective are forwarded. 
Keywords: Key Account Management, Business-to-Business Relationship, Social Exchange Theory, Relational Norm, 
Opportunism.
JEL Classifications: M1, M3, M310.
1. Introduction
Marketing literatures explore that primary focus of 
marketing is the exchange relationship (Hunt, 1983) and to 
fruitfully complete marketing activities, building and 
maintaining exchange relationship with customers is vital. 
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Extension of such types of exchange relationships between 
customer and supplier vary because all of them are not 
equal relating to the volume purchased, strategic important 
like affiliation prestige, entering into a new untapped market, 
or transferring of new know-how and technology. This 
implies that suppliers are selective in building and 
maintaining exchange relationship with their customer and 
prefer those which have strategic importance. These 
customers are thus termed as key customers (Millman & 
Wilson, 1995) in the business-to-business (B-to-B) market. 
To this end, managing efficient exchange relationship with 
these customers are pivotal for the supplier, as they 
demand special treatment from their supplier relating to their 
strategic and operational arena. Ojasalo (2001) states that 
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successful key account management requires the 
development of suitable strategy and uplifting the operational 
capabilities of the supplier company because these 
customers demand changes from their suppliers, seek to 
develop global supply relationship relating to productions and 
sourcing strategy (Montgomery et al., 1999). Therefore, this 
study defines key account management as the supplier 
company initiated approach targeted at the most important 
customers to solve their complex requirements with special 
treatment that eventually ensures both parties’ financial and 
nonfinancial objectives (Ahmmed & Noor, 2012). 
Successful relationship is enduring and for such 
sustenance, relationship requires some maintenance 
mechanisms that act as a glue between key account buyer 
and seller. As it is very difficult to create comprehensive 
contracts between buyer and seller (Goetz & Scott, 1981; 
Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; Macneil, 1980) to uphold such 
exchange relationship, necessity of having non-contractual 
mechanisms that govern the exchange process between 
firms are indispensable (Dwyer et al., 1987; Gundlach & 
Murphy, 1993; Heide & John, 1988). To this end, as a 
non-contractual mechanism “relational norms” between the 
firms can operate as safeguarding means. In the Social 
exchange theory (SET), ‘relationship’ between the exchange 
parties is considered as the non-contractual governance 
mechanism of exchange. Therefore, how does this relational 
norm develop, work and facilitate the development and 
maintenance of exchange relationship in business-to-business 
context in connection with SET is a vital area to discover, 
the central thrust of the article.
In this article, we develop a structure of key account 
management approach at the organizational level using the 
concept of SET. This structure highlights the usage of 
relationship as the non-contractual governance mechanism of 
exchange at the organizational level to successfully manage 
the company’s most important customers. The ways in which 
exchange forces affect the practice of key account 
management approach and how they can be managed to 
get the fruitful results are the primary orientation of the 
article.   
Subsequent sections are organized into six sections. 
Section I: key account management; Section II: social 
exchange theory; Section III: social exchange theory in 
business-to-business relationship; Section IV:  development 
of ‘relationship’ as non-contractual governing mechanism; 
Section V: perspective of social exchange theory in key 
account management approach; and Section VI: implications 
and conclusion.
2. Section I: Key Account Management
At the organizational level key account management is 
the systematic selection, analysis and management of the 
most important present and future customers of the 
company with the set-up and maintenance of needed 
infrastructure (Zupancic, 2008). As these customers show 
demands for solution of complex requirements, thus 
company needs to build a portfolio of loyal key accounts by 
offering them a product/service package in customized form 
on an ongoing basis (McDonald et al., 1997). Brehmer and 
Rehme (2009) relate key account management to the 
management and development of the relationship in a more 
or less formal structure by an organization. Workman, 
Homburg, and Jensen (2003) mention the need to be more 
responsive to the needs of important customers and treat 
them differently from other customers. They also suggest the 
performance of additional activities directed at the most 
important customers. 
As companies are doing additional jobs in response to 
the key customers’ requirements, thus proper implementation 
of those activities is pivotal to reap the best results as 
expected. In this regards, building exchange relationship 
between them are essential to implement key account 
management program. From the part of supplier 
implementation of key account management program needs 
a proper understanding of the program, appropriate 
coordination of various departments and a successful 
monitoring. Zupancic (2008) opines that a systematic work 
schedule is necessary to develop the structure and 
processes as well as people to set up a professional key 
account management organization. Smith (2009) explores 
necessity of successful targeting; requirements of rare 
knowledge assets like knowledge of the customer value 
chain; requirements of organizational change; requirements 
for different approach to measure the value created for the 
customers; and requirements of organizational learning for a 
proper implementation of key account management program 
at the organization level. As key account selling is one type 
of relational selling activity, Foster and Cadogan (2000) 
showed that successful “relationship selling” is correlated 
with increased trust, enhanced loyalty, enhanced purchase 
intentions and greater likelihood that the buyer will 
recommend the supplier to other firms.  
In the above discussion reciprocity in the form of knowing 
and meeting key customers requirements and in return 
realizing various benefits in diverse forms as expected are 
evident which indicating actions contingent on rewarding 
reactions from others (Blau, 1964), the core tenant of Social 
Exchange Theory. Social Exchange Theory entails that 
human behavior is in essence an exchange (Homans, 1961), 
particularly of rewards (Homans, 1961) or resources of 
primarily material character (wealth) (Cook, 2000; Stolte et 
al., 2001) and secondarily of symbolic attributes (Zafirovski, 
2003) as detailed in the next section.
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3. Section II: Social Exchange Theory
This section is structured with an elaborated discussion 
on social exchange theory followed by the discussion on 
dimensions of exchange, types of exchange and propositions 
relating to social exchange theory. 
3.1. An Overview of Social Exchange Theory
Social exchange theory (SET) grew out of the intersection 
of economics, psychology and sociology and was developed 
to comprehend the human social behavior from the 
economic perspectives (Homans, 1958). The major 
proposition behind the social exchange theory is that 
persons behave in such a way which adds value to the 
outcomes they treat positively and refrain from showing 
those behaviors that impact negatively on the outcomes in 
the relationship (Rodriguez & Wilson, 2002). Accordingly, 
studies in key account management research have relied 
heavily on social exchange theory in building models of the 
exchange relationship between key account customer and 
supplier.
SET views exchange relationship between key account 
customers and supplier as “actions contingent on rewarding 
reactions from others” (Blau, 1964). The things exchanged 
here include goods, material goods as well as non-material 
goods including prestige or symbols of authorization 
(Homans, 1958). In the key account management approach 
both economic and non-economic elements like relationship 
bondage and cooperation are involved (Andaleeb, 1995; 
Choi & Hartley, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998; Johnston et 
al., 2004). Lee et al. (2010) state that researchers have 
recognized that in the industrial relationships, it goes beyond 
“arms-length” span where an effective long-standing 
relationship depend greatly on social exchange behavior 
such as commitment and trust (Dorsch et al., 1998; Roberts 
et al., 2003; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006; Ural, 2007; Wong & 
Cheung, 2005; Wong & Sohal, 2002).
To understand social exchange theory easily, it can be 
discussed through its three core elements namely outcome, 
comparison level and comparison level of alternatives 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Outcome of a relationship is the 
difference between the costs of obtaining an object and the 
rewards realized from owing and using that object that 
means, Outcome= Rewards – Costs (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959). Comparison level (CL) indicates a person’s 
expectation from a particular relationship that he feels 
reasonable to receive (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Social 
exchange theory holds that in addition of considering one’s 
expectation from the relationship, a person should compare 
the alternatives available or CLalt that has essential impact 
on keeping or breaking an existing relationship (Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959). Thus the perception of outcome, comparison 
level and comparison level of alternative can be used in 
many areas of personal and organizational level to judge the 
status of existing relationship as presented in the following 
figure. 
Outcome= Rewards – Costs
Outcomes > Comparison Level (CL) = Satisfaction;
Outcomes < CL = Dissatisfaction
Outcomes > Comparison Level of Alternative (Clalt) =            
                                    Relationship Continuation;
Outcomes < Clalt = Relationship Termination
CLalt > Outcome > CL= Relationship Termination
<Figure 1> Interplay of outcomes, comparison level and 
comparison level of alternative in Exchange Relationship.
In the exchange relationship, interaction involves outcomes 
relating to economic and social gains. With the passes of 
time party evaluation, these outcomes with their expectation 
of rewards and outcomes from available alternative. Lambe 
et al. (2001) explain that if the results or outcomes are 
positive in the long run, then parties will show higher trust 
on each other and greater commitment to keep the 
relationship for long. Connecting to such trust and 
commitment in SET, other significant elements of social 
exchange include equity, conflict, and opportunism (Moore & 
Cunningham III, 1999). Norms of equity behavior are based 
on the assumption that parties wish to maximize gains and 
minimize losses in exchange relationships, implying a 
sharing of benefits and burdens (Van de Ven et al., 1984). 
On the other hand, disagreement on interest develops 
conflicts which come in the form of mutual interference or 
blocking behavior (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Dwyer et al., 
1987; Gaski, 1984). Finally, partner’s opportunism behavior 
comes in the form of lack of honesty in transactions, 
withholding or distorting information with the intent to 
mislead and failing to fulfill promises or obligations (Hill, 
1990; Williamson, 1981; John, 1984) that can be avoided or 
reduced by showing more openness and honesty (Moore & 
Cunningham III, 1999).
3.1.1. Dimensions of Exchange
In business, relationship exchange takes place in all the 
areas of transactions. Within this exchange relationship, 
some parties, elements of exchange, underlying agreement 
and the focus of exchange are involved.  Levine and White 
(1961) stated that there are four main dimensions to the 
actual exchange situation. They are:
 The Parties to the Exchange: In the relational exchange 
at least buyer and seller are involved and in broad sense 
as mentioned by Gummesson (2008) many-headed customer 
and the many-headed supplier are involved with the 
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exchange relationship. 
The Kinds and Quantities Exchanged: According to Levine 
and White (1961) these two aspects involve two main 
classes: the actual elements exchanged (consumers, labor 
services, and resources other than labor services), and 
information on the availability of these organizational 
elements and on rights and obligations regarding them.
3.1.2. The Agreement Underlying the Exchange
In the exchange relationship prior agreement act as 
controlling mechanism whether it is formal and written or 
informal and implicit. In the formal agreement, exact 
conditions and procedures are mentioned which the parties 
are bound to conform to continue the relationship. On the 
other hand, informal agreement contingent on the parties 
believe on the fact that one party will behave as expected 
in turn other party’s action. 
3.1.3. The Direction of the Exchange
Flow of organizational elements is multidirectional 
including unilateral, reciprocal and co-operational (Levine & 
White, 1961). In the unilateral flow, elements move from one 
organization to another, whereas reciprocal movement 
ensures the inflow and outflow of organizational elements 
between two organizations. In addition, joint or co-operational 
movement ensures the flow of organizational elements or 
resources to act following a unified approach to bring 
betterment for both parties involved or this betterment is 
achieved by serving the third party in a coordinate manner. 
3.1.4. Types of Exchange 
Types of exchange are categorized into two broad 
categories. Namely, resource’s particularism means the 
resource’s worth that varies based on its source and 
resource’s concreteness means how tangible or specific the 
resource is. Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) mention that 
less particularistic and the more concrete a benefit is, the 
more likely it is to be exchanged in a short-term, quid pro 
quo (something for something) fashion. In contrast, benefits 
that are highly particularistic and symbolic are exchanged in 
a more open-ended manner they added. In addition, it is not 
uncommon to expect monetary payment for a specific good, 
but less likely to be true for love or status (Cropanzano & 
Mitchell, 2005). In practice, these items are exchanged 
through three types of exchange including restricted 
exchange, generalized exchange and complex exchange. 
Restricted exchange refers to two-party reciprocal 
relationships in the form of “gives to and receives from” 
fashion (Bagozzi, 1975). With this exchange category, two 
features are involved. Firstly, a great deal of attempt 
requires to maintain equality that ensures repeatable social 
exchange and consequently acts and minimizes the 
propensity of gaining advantages at the expense of other 
interest (Bagozzi, 1975). Secondly, the propensity of 
maintaining a mutual agreement between two parties in 
which each party provides a good or services in return for 
the same shows the quid pro quo mentality. On the other 
hand, parties involved in generalized exchange in a 
voluntary manner are not obliged to response as expected 
by others and are benefited indirectly. In this case, univocal 
reciprocity occurs between the involved parties (Bagozzi, 
1975). Finally, in the complex exchange situation, each 
social actor is involved in at least one direct exchange, 
while the entire system is organized by an interconnecting 
web of complex relationships (Bagozzi, 1975).
In practice and more frequently, restricted and complex 
exchange takes place in the business-to-business relational 
exchange. In the exchange relationship, one party does 
something with an expectation of getting something valuable 
and greater that what the party is rendering for the other 
party. These notions are evident in the restricted and 
complex exchange relationship. 
3.2. Propositions of Social Exchange Theory 
Bases on the belief of Social Exchange Theory “actions 
contingent on rewarding reactions from others” (Blau, 1964) 
and outcome, comparison level and comparison level of 
alternatives (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), several propositions 
are forwards. The first and foremost proposition is “success 
proposition” as the performance frequency of an action 
depends on how often a particular action is rewarded 
(Griffith et al., 2006). Beyond this rewards consideration, a 
party in exchange relationship judges the importance of an 
exchange and thus decides to do that repeatedly. This 
judgment ensures the value proposition (Blau, 1964) of 
doing an action more frequently over time. As the expected 
rewards do not accrue in all exchange or receiving of 
unexpected punishment take place, the exchange member 
will aggressively avoid the action in the future that refers to 
the aggression proposition (Homans, 1961). Finally, in 
choosing between actions, parties behave rationally through 
selecting the better rewarding exchange that causes the 
rationality proposition (Griffith et al., 2006).
4. Section III: Social Exchange Theory in 
Business-to-Business Relationship
During the initial researches power and dependency were 
used as governing mechanism between buyer and seller in 
the business-to-business exchange (Hunt et al., 1985) where 
one party is bound to behave according to the prescribed 
manner as forwarded by more powerful party (Dahl, 1957; 
French & Raven, 1959). As it was creating conflicts between 
concerned parties, later on transaction cost analysis was 
used to examine B-to-B exchange (Lambe et al., 2001). 
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Because of the governance problem to safeguarding 
relational assets (Heide & John, 1988) and ensuring partner 
adaptation (Heide & John, 1990) or avoiding risk of partner 
opportunism with transaction cost analysis, relational control 
in the form of norms or personal relations is often 
considered and used as an effective means of governance 
(Anderson & Narus, 1984, 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994; Wilson, 1995). Additionally, as it is very 
difficult to develop a comprehensive contract (Goetz & Scott, 
1981; Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; Macneil, 1980) necessary 
to support the maintenance of long-term bond, 
non-contractual methods of governance (Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; Heide & John, 1988) are critical 
to successful exchange which is developed through repeated 
social exchange. Eventually, researchers of B-to-B exchange 
have increasingly drawn on social exchange theory (Lambe 
et al., 2001) as SET focuses on the ‘relationship’ between 
the exchange parties as the governance mechanism of 
exchange (Anderson & Narus, 1984, 1990; Dwyer et al., 
1987).
5. Section IV: Development of ‘Relationship’ 
as Non-Contractual Governing Mechanism
In this section researchers endeavored to discuss the 
development of ‘relationship’ that acts as governance 
mechanism of relational exchange between buyer and seller 
in business-to-business setting. As both parties are coming 
to establish an exchange relationship to achieve their 
different goals, an exercise of power may take place which 
develops power-dependence relationship. Accordingly, the 
probability of showing opportunistic behavior increases which 
can be minimized through relational investment in 
non-redeployable assets. Following these investments, 
propensity of commitment develops and parties began to 
show high trust to each other. Subsequently, a reciprocal 
environment ensures ‘relationship’ as exchange relation 
maintaining mechanism in the business-to-business context. 
Detail discussions on these issues are given in the following 
sub-sections. 
5.1. Power Dependency and Opportunism
In the exchange relationship one party can depend on 
another for a variety of reasons including power. In practice, 
this power includes reward and coercive power; persuasion 
power; image power and authority power (Dwyer & Tanner, 
2002). Emerson (1962) exerts that power resides implicitly in 
the other's dependency. He mentions that social relations 
commonly entail ties of mutual dependence between the 
parties. This mutual dependency may generate some control 
on one party by another which develops power-dependence 
relationship. Here dependence of one party upon another is 
(1) directly proportional to first party’s motivational investment 
in goals mediated by second party, and (2) inversely 
proportional to the availability of those goals to first party 
outside of the both parties’ relation (Emerson, 1962). Cook 
(1977) states that use of power by the actor with the power 
advantage to obtain increased rewards across time increases 
his dependence upon the other party to the exchange. This 
is because actor may invest more in relational assets or the 
other party who has more alternative to choose from. In the 
buyer-seller dyad, this power dependence relationship 
develops uncertainty for that party which is in less 
advantageous state in the asymmetric relationship. 
In connection to the asymmetric power Whitmeyer (2001) 
contents that it is the extent to which an actor or a set of 
actors can affect some social phenomena that could appear 
in the form of behavior or outcomes (Belaya et al., 2009). 
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) mention that in the power 
imbalance condition more powerful actor finds it easier than 
less powerful party to dictate the terms of relationship by 
threatening to withdraw from the exchange. In this regards, 
Friedkin (1986) and Piskorski and Casciaro (2004) mention 
that the most likely result of this power imbalance is that 
more powerful actor will appropriate a larger portion of the 
overall benefits accruing from the exchange. Additionally, as 
both parties are exposed to risk and opportunistic behavior 
from their counter-part, deployment of relational assets are 
pivotal to cement and preserve the relationship.  
5.2. Relational Investments 
As stated by Fischer and Bristor (1994), “social exchange 
theory explicitly predicts social relationships to be based on 
each partner’s motivational investment and anticipated social 
gain.”  High level of investment in relationship-specific assets 
bonds suppliers more closely to their accounts, creates 
mutual dependence, aligns their interests and encourages 
mutual adjustment (Weiss & Kurland, 1997). Anderson and 
Weitz (1989) term these investments as idiosyncratic 
investments which are specific to a channel relationship 
difficult or impossible to redeploy to another channel 
relationship; therefore, they lose substantial value unless the 
relationship continues. Whereas other suppliers can invest in 
non-transaction specific assets to obtain the buyer’s 
business, transaction-oriented assets are harder to duplicate 
(Porter, 1985) and both these assets create buyer 
dependence (Pillai & Sharma, 2003) which in turn helps to 
achieve the desired goals (Frazier, 1983; Ganesan, 1994).
Thus, a lock-in situation is created when the deployment 
of mutual specific assets taken place, because both the 
parties are exposed to risk and opportunistic behavior (Burki 
& Buvik, 2010). This symmetric deployment of specific 
assets develops balanced dependence structure that serves 
the interests of both parties and also preserves the 
relationship (Buvik & Haugland, 2005). Accordingly, positive 
economic and social outcomes over time are assured which 
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increase the partners’ trust of each other and commitment to 
maintaining the exchange relationship (Lambe et al., 2001).
5.3. Commitment and Trust
5.3.1. Commitment
Commitment is the pledge of exchange parties in the 
business-to-business relationship. Cook and Emerson (1978) 
characterized commitment as a central variable in distinguish 
social exchange from economic exchange. In the exchange 
relationship commitment can be defined as an exchange 
partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another 
party is worth working on to warrant maximum efforts at 
maintaining it (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). These efforts may 
come in the form of both parties’ investment in relational 
assets which develop credible commitment between the 
parties involved (Blau, 1964; Cook & Emerson, 1978) and 
this mutual commitment acts as foundation for the 
relationship (Berry & Parasuraman, 1991). At the 
commitment stage shared values and decision making 
structures support joint investment into the relationship. 
When parties follow through on commitments, they enhance 
trust and strengthen relationships.
5.3.2. Trust
As an element of social exchange trust can be defined 
as “the firm’s belief that another company will perform 
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the firm, as 
well as not take unexpected actions that would result in 
negative outcomes for the firm” (Anderson & Narus, 1990). 
Creating trust is an important aspect of social exchange 
because social exchange is governed to a large degree by 
social “obligations” rather than by contracts (Blau, 1968). 
Thus, trust ultimately acts as glue that holds a relationship 
together over the long-run. It also reflects the extent of one 
party's confidence in another party's integrity. Similarly, it 
reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior from partner, 
lowers transaction costs and develops a long-term orientation 
(Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Ganesan, 1994; Williamson, 
1979).
5.4. Reciprocal Exposure and Development of 
‘Relationship’ as Governing Mechanism
In the social exchange relationship as parties trust each 
other through their commitment into the relationship, both 
parties engage in perennial transactions over time. These 
recurrent transactions in the long-run ensure reciprocity 
between buyer and seller. Chris and Graham (2007) mention 
that every long-term relationship includes some give-and-take 
between the parties; one make allowances and grants in 
favors to the other in exchange for the same treatment 
when its own need arises. Similarly, positive exchange 
interactions over time also produce relational exchange 
norms that govern the exchange partners’ interactions 
(Lambe et al., 2001)
As power is avoided in the social exchange relationship, 
therefore, existence of norm is essential that act as 
non-contractual governance mechanism of the exchange 
relationship. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) mention that social 
exchange relies on norms because they provide mutually 
agreed upon means of controlling behavior without the 
difficulties created by using power. They also describe that 
both weaker and stronger parties are benefited from norms 
because they introduce some form of regularity and control 
without the use of contracts or legal mechanisms. Homans 
(1958) posits that in a group setting, the more one conforms 
to norms the more rewards and interaction one will receive 
from other members of the group or network. Thus, it 
increases the efficiency of relationships because by agreeing 
to the manner in which interactions take place, the degree 
of uncertainty may be reduced (Lambe et al., 2001). 
Lee et al. (2010) state that researchers have 
acknowledged that relationships in an industrial setting goes 
beyond “arms-length” relationships as a successful long-term 
relationship rely heavily on social exchange behavior such 
as trust and commitment. Over time, as parties show their 
commitment to the relationship through relational investment 
in a trusted environment and as positive outcomes accrue 
for parties, a bonded relationship establish that acts as 
non-contractual governance mechanism. Lambe et al. (2001) 
explain that the critical governance mechanism in relational 
exchange is the ‘relationship’ between the exchange parties.  
Thus, such relationships provide a governance mechanism 
built on the foundation of trust, commitment, and exchange 
norms that replace or supplement more formal governance 
mechanisms such as contracts (Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; 
Heide & John, 1992). 
6. Section V: Perspective of Social Exchange 
Theory in Key Account Management 
Approach
The main assumption behind social exchange theory is 
that actors behave in ways that increase outcomes they 
value positively and decrease those they value negatively in 
the relationship (Rodriguez & Wilson, 2002). From the key 
account management context, the model views the exchange 
relationship between key account customers and supplier 
as “actions contingent on rewarding reactions from others” 
(Blau, 1964).
The work of Mills and Clark (1982) mentions that 
exchange relationships demand repayment within a particular 
time period, involve exchanges of economic or 
quasi-economic goods and are motivated by personal 
self-interest. For example, in the context of key account 
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management relationships, a company makes a contribution 
to its key account, via its key account management strategy. 
These contributions may be relational assets, better 
performance through internal coordination, senior 
management supports and involvement and so on. In turn, 
an expectation forms for the return of a contribution at a 
later time which may include profits, enhanced relationship, 
business continuity or repeat order and development of trust. 
Key account receiving a valued contribution develops a 
sense of obligation and reciprocates with appropriate 
attitudinal and behavioral responses in the form of relational 
intimacy, investment in relational assets, or maintaining 
relationship for long.
Key account management is known as customer focused 
marketing strategy targeted at the companies most important 
customer (Gosselin & Bauwen, 2006) and relationship 
literatures explore that customer focused relational strategy 
ensures dyadic outcomes like coordinated and 
complementary actions between exchange partners in their 
efforts to achieve mutual goals (Anderson & Narus, 1990; 
Homburg et al., 2003; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Palmatier et 
al., 2006). Additionally, Spekman et al. (1997) explore that 
exchange participants begin to expect that their partners will 
participate in cooperative behaviors that benefit the firms. 
This coordination offers buyer a sense of co-ownership of 
the process and will foster a greater degree of commitment 
to the supplier (Anderson & Narus, 1990), who is now more 
truly a partner in the relationship (Homburg et al., 2003). As 
these cooperative behaviors become common, expected and 
acceptable either implicitly or explicitly, cooperation becomes 
a norm.
In practice, in the exchange relationship suppliers serve 
the key account customers with their best efforts in the form 
of better quality products, investment in relational assets, 
intra-organizational coordination and others in an implicit 
anticipation of maximizing revenue earnings, development of 
trust and commitment for better relationship, sharing valuable 
information, reduction of conflict and so on. If companies do 
not expect to get these benefits from the key accounts to 
justify the time, energy and money they spent, they are less 
likely to willingly take part in the social exchange by helping 
the key account customers. It is evident that companies 
have no guarantee that the key accounts will reciprocate as 
expected. It is a matter of supplier companies’ believes in 
the key account customers’ business continuation intentions. 
If key account customers justify these believes by 
reciprocating as expected in the form of benefits expected, 
the reciprocity is likely to lead to ever expanding social 
exchange between the two. On the other hand, failure to do 
so will be treated as a social offense and will probably lead 
to reduced future social exchanges between the two (Blau, 
1964). 
7. Section VI: Implications and Conclusion
From this study, implications can be presented from 
triangular perspective. The expanded notion of key account 
management approach provides us information about what it 
is, how it is managed and for what it is necessary. A 
detailed discussion on social exchange theory reveals its 
functional arena by which we can easily understand its 
applicability. Finally, social exchange theory is shown as 
underpinning for the key account management approach to 
practice. 
The expanded notion of key account management 
approach implies that it is not a discrete performance rather 
a systematic process that is followed to serve the key 
customer. As customers have their own comparison and 
alternative choices a careful identification, selection and 
aiming the suitable key accounts are necessary. This is also 
essential because the deployment of resources and the 
propensity of opportunistic behavior from buyer part is 
prevalence. Finally, as social exchange theory is unable to 
show the path of relationship dissolution (Dwyer et al., 1987) 
supplier should keep attention on overall principles for which 
key account management approach is undertaken. 
The examination of social exchange theory develops 
several implications for the fruitful management of key 
account in business-to-business relationship. It illustrates how 
relational norm is central to manage the company’s most 
important customers and demonstrates how this norm can 
be developed in buyer-seller key account relationship. As 
both parties are in contrast in serving their purposes, thus, 
alignment is needed and can be developed between them 
by assuring the parties’ commitment into the relationship. In 
this connection more commitments are coming when both 
parties are investing in the relational non-redeployable 
assets. This commitment, in turn, ensures trust whose direct 
result is the development of relational norm. Here, the ways 
must be found out to ensure this trust developing reciprocal 
investment. In the buyer-seller relationship, it is a thorny 
process that deserves further investigation. 
Although in the social exchange theory clear-cut 
benchmark is absent for objective evaluation of comparison 
level and comparison level for alternatives (Wulf & 
Odekerken-Schröder, 2001), by applying the notion of 
comparison level and comparison level of alternatives 
relationship norm can be assessed. In this regard supplier 
provides various benefits through its key account 
management approach that meet the buyer expectation 
(comparison level) and if these values are superior to other 
suppliers (comparison level of alternative) then a tie-up 
situation is developed which requires less use of coercion to 
get the key accounts performing desired actions. Eventually, 
‘relationship’ norm is formed by maintaining the exchange 
relationship over time. 
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